CWE-1319

電磁障害注入（EM-FI）に対する不適切な保護

Improper Protection against Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EM-FI)

脆弱性作成中

日本語説明

このデバイスは、電磁障害注入攻撃の影響を受けやすく、デバイスの内部情報が漏洩したり、セキュリティ・メカニズムがバイパスされたりする。

電磁フォールト・インジェクションは、攻撃者が集積回路の信号（内部と外部の両方）を局所的かつ動的に変更することを可能にする可能性があります。EM-FI 攻撃は、デバイス近傍に局所的な過渡磁界を発生させ、デバイス配線に電流を誘導する。典型的な EMFI のセットアップは、EMI コイルに大電流の過渡電流を発生させるパルス・インジェクション回路で構成され、急峻な磁気パルスを発生させ、それがターゲットにカップリングしてデバイスにフォールトを生じさせます：

原文 (English)

The device is susceptible to electromagnetic fault injection attacks, causing device internal information to be compromised or security mechanisms to be bypassed.

Electromagnetic fault injection may allow an attacker to locally and dynamically modify the signals (both internal and external) of an integrated circuit. EM-FI attacks consist of producing a local, transient magnetic field near the device, inducing current in the device wires. A typical EMFI setup is made up of a pulse injection circuit that generates a high current transient in an EMI coil, producing an abrupt magnetic pulse which couples to the target producing faults in the device, which can lead to:

関連する脆弱性

想定される影響

Scope: Confidentiality, Integrity, Access Control, Availability / Impact: Modify Memory; Read Memory; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity; Bypass Protection Mechanism; Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands

対策・緩和策

• 1. Redundancy - By replicating critical operations and comparing the two outputs can help indicate whether a fault has been injected.
• 2. Error detection and correction codes - Gay, Mael, et al. proposed a new scheme that not only detects faults injected by a malicious adversary but also automatically corrects single nibble/byte errors introduced by low-multiplicity faults.
• 3. Fail by default coding - When checking conditions (switch or if) check all possible cases and fail by default because the default case in a switch (or the else part of a cascaded if-else-if construct) is used for dealing with the last possible (and valid) value without checking. This is prone to fault injection because this alternative is easily selected as a result of potential data manipulation [REF-1141].
• 4. Random Behavior - adding random delays before critical operations, so that timing is not predictable.
• 5. Program Flow Integrity Protection - The program flow can be secured by integrating run-time checking aiming at detecting control flow inconsistencies. One such example is tagging the source code to indicate the points not to be bypassed [REF-1147].
• 6. Sensors - Usage of sensors can detect variations in voltage and current.
• 7. Shields - physical barriers to protect the chips from malicious manipulation.

外部リンク

MITRE公式ページ — CWE-1319